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  Abstract 
It is common to observe that demand elasticities in trade equations for imports are implausibly large, and that they 
differ between countries. Both of these present us with problems, as they imply trade will rise without bound as a 
the increase in trade as a proportion of GDP. We show that the inclusion of the ratios of outward and inward FDI to 
GDP as additional openness and globalisation indicators appear to remove the spurious accuracy with which we are 
measuring demand elasticities. 
 
Keywords: International trade; FDI 
JEL codes: F10, F23. 
 
proportion of GDP. The research reported here looks for alternative empirical evidence of possible factors driving 
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Non-technical summary 
 
Almost all discussions of globalisation and the internationalisation of production highlight the 
growing share of trade in output, one of the most striking features of the world economy since 
World War II, and even more in the last twenty years. Since 1980, world real imports have 
grown faster than world real GDP. Studies of import demand relationships suggest that the 
income elasticity of import demand is well in excess of one in all countries, and frequently above 
two. This could be a temporary phenomenon, and the strong observed relationship between 
income growth and import growth could disappear. If it did not disappear then as imports would 
continue to grow faster than income and quite quickly (almost) all income would be spent on 
imports in all countries, and (almost) all output would be exported. Although this might happen 
in small very open economies such as Singapore it seems an unlikely outcome for all countries in 
the world. Indeed, it is probably the case that other factors that are currently growing in line with 
income are the true drivers of rising import penetration.  
The research reported here looks for factors that might increase the level of trade over time. 
These factors would need to be such that their effect reached a maximum at some point before 
import penetration reached 100%, and hence we should look for openness or technology 
indicators, for instance, that are bounded, but which can grow significantly over long periods of 
time.  
Over the last 25 years new explanations for the level and growth of trade have been developed, 
and these ‘new trade theory’ approaches have stressed the role of relocation in explaining 
increased levels of imports and exports. Changes in the variety and quality of goods are seen as 
central to explaining these trends, and they are also at the centre of our argument. Increases in 
the level of FDI represent increases in the capacity of a country to produce a greater variety of 
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goods, especially in a world of differentiated products. More firms means more products, and 
hence a greater variety of goods.  
In this paper we investigate import demand in a large range of countries. In a first step, we 
estimate import demand equations with traditional determinants (domestic demand and relative 
prices). The results show that it is statistically impossible to impose common demand and price 
elasticities, and the observed demand elasticity remained high. In a second step, we estimate an 
equation that includes the ratios of outward and inward FDI to GDP as additional openness and 
globalisation indicators. These variables appear to remove the spurious accuracy with which we 
were measuring demand elasticities. The variety of coefficients and effects, which differ between 
countries, means that we cannot statistically justifiably impose a common set of coefficients on 
inward and outward FDI in all countries. However, overall inward and outward FDI appear to 
raise imports. Moreover, it is possible to impose common income effects once we allow for 
inward and outward FDI as a determinant of import propensities, and the income elasticity of 
demand is reduced to 1.24, well below the estimated elasticities we observe either in single 
country regressions or in those derived in panels when we do not include inward and outward 
FDI. Hence we demonstrate that the inclusion of the ratio of outward and inward FDI as a 
percent of GDP resolves most of these puzzles we face with import demand. 
However, we would argue that there is need for further research to understand both the diversity 
of FDI effects between countries and the role of other forces driving globalisation such as the 
formation of regional trading systems, which raise imports as a proportion of GDP. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
Almost all discussions of globalisation and the internationalisation of production highlight the 
growing share of trade in output. Indeed, trade’s growing share in the world economy is one of 
the most striking features of the world economy since World War II, and even more in the last 
twenty years. Since 1980, world real imports have grown faster than world real GDP. Most  
countries, no matter their types – small and large, rich and poor, fast-growers and slow growers - 
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all countries in the world. Indeed, it is probably the case that other factors that are currently 
growing in line with income are the true drivers of rising import penetration. If this were the case 
then we cannot expect the income elasticity of demand in relationships of this nature to remain 
stable. The standard empirical models based on traditional comparative advantage theory 
discussed in Barrell and te Velde (2002) appear unable to explain the excess growth in imports. 
The research reported here looks for alternative empirical evidence of possible factors driving 
the increase in trade as a proportion of GDP. In particular, we need to look for factors that might 
increase the level of trade over time. These factors would need to be such that their effect 
reached a maximum at some point before import penetration reached 100%, and hence we 
should look for openness or technology indicators, for instance, that are bounded, but which can 
grow significantly over long periods of time.  
Many factors could be at work, and Barrell and te Velde (2002), for instance look for a role for 
regional trade and competition liberalisation. Such programmes reduce barriers to trade and 
hence can be expected to raise the level of imports (and hence exports) for any level of output 
and income. They do find a role for the Single Market Programme (SMP) in Europe in 
expanding the level of imports within Europe, and this is clearly associated with the reduction in 
barriers to trade and to competition within the Single Market. However, Barrell and te Velde 
(2002) find that many of the impacts of liberalisation are captured by increased foreign direct 
investment (FDI) within Europe. They argue that the process of liberalisation has induced 
significant bilateral cross border movements of production, and that this has been accompanied 
by an increase in imports into both home and host countries. The FDI indicators ‘replace’ the 
Single Market indicators, in that they represent the true driving force increasing trade, rather than 
acting as proxies for it. Similar trade and capital movement liberalisation has taken place within 
North America under NAFTA, and to a lesser extent in Mercosur and in the APEC open region, 
and these can be expected to have increased the level of trade. Barrell and Choy (2003) argue 
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that increased FDI has been a major feature in increasing integration within Europe, and that it is 
the removal of the barriers to the movement of productive capital that has been particularly 
important in reshaping the pattern and scale of trade within Europe. They also argue that the 
importance of FDI in the integration process has increased in the last few years 
Over the last 25 years new explanations for the level and growth of trade have been developed, 
and these ‘new trade theory’ approaches have stressed the role of relocation in explaining 
increased levels of imports and exports. Krugman (1989) for instance points out that rapidly 
growing countries tend to have rapidly growing exports and hence rising real exchange rates. He 
suggests that such trends need explaining, as real exchange rates should be stationary in the long 
run. Changes in the variety and quality of goods are seen as central to explaining these trends, 
and they are also at the centre of our argument. Increases in the level of FDI represent increases 
in the capacity of a country to produce a greater variety of goods, especially in a world of 
differentiated products. More firms means more products, and hence a greater variety of goods. 
Of course direct indicators of regional trade agreements and tariff barrier measures could be used 
as well. The former are often rather crude indicators, although Barrell and te Velde (2002) do use 
‘aquis signing’ measures of SMP intensity. However, these do not work as well as FDI. In 
addition, the genuine reduction of barriers is normally accompanied by increases in FDI. 
Measuring tariff and non-tariff barriers is particularly difficult, especially as it is the non-tariff 
ones that appear to have been more effective in the last two decades. Barrell and Pain (1999) 
argue that anti-dumping measures induce Japanese FDI in Europe, and this forms a substitute for 
imports. Clearly, the impacts of trade liberalisation and FDI on import penetration are more 
complex than the patterns discussed here, and merit further work.  
In the second section of this paper we discuss the implications of new trade theory for import 
equations, and conclude that we cannot draw unambiguous implications. In the third section we 
look at the estimation of trade equations based on new trade theory, where the effects of FDI are 
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present. We might expect that increased outward direct investment would in general increase 
imports, as domestic production for domestic consumption shifts to being foreign production for 
domestic consumption. The impact on imports of inward FDI is less clear, as it may either 
substitute for imports or induce an increase in imports in order to enable production for export to 
foreign markets. Hence our general priors are that FDI has increased trade, but that its effects can 
be diverse. 
 
2.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
The changing nature of the world economy, and in particular changing technology and the 
removal of barriers to trade have meant that the factors affecting aggregate export and import 
demand have been changing over time. There have been a number of attempts to include 
theoretically justifiable additional variables in trade equations, and Pain and Wakelin (1998) and 
Barrell and te Velde (2002) present evidence that adequate and stable export and import demand 
models can be constructed. It appears to be of crucial importance to include non-price factors 
and relocation effects. Recent developments in trade theory have extended our understanding of 
the determinants of trade, and the introduction of imperfect competition into such models has 
allowed us to look at the determinants of the number of firms in an economy, and hence at its 
ability to export and need to import.  
Krugman (1989) claims that fast-growing countries expand their share of world markets not by 
reducing the relative price of their goods but by expanding the range of products they produce as 
their economies grow. Simple empirical studies give higher export demand elasticities and low 
import demand elasticities to fast growing countries than to slow growing ones, and suggest that 
there is a difference in income elasticities of the demand for imports and exports among 
countries with different growth rates. This might lead us to think that the rate of growth in output 
would affect the current balance, and hence the equilibrium level of the real exchange rate. 
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However, if we allow for this increased range and quality of products in import demand models 
it is not clear whether these differences are persistent. 
The theory of international trade developed in the 1980s acknowledged the influence of non-
price factors, such as innovation, and of the importance of the relative quality and range of 
domestically produced and imported products, especially in manufactures. Fagerberg (1996) 
points to the importance of technology affecting international competitiveness, both theoretically  
and empirically. He claims that there may be some heterogeneity among countries in the way 
technology and other variables affect competitiveness, but that the evidence so far prevents us  
from drawing strong conclusions. 
The role of multinational corporations has also been discussed, for instance in Krugman (1995) 
and they have a major role in both the new trade theory and the new economic geography. It is 
useful to view the multinational corporation as essentially a multi-plant firm choosing where to 
locate its plants. This decision will depend on the economies of scale within the plant as 
compared to those at the level of the firm, and also on the costs of moving goods from a plant to 
a market. These costs will depend on distance and on barriers to trade produced by national 
borders. As firm-based economies of scale become more common with the use of information 
and computer-based technologies, we might expect to see more multi-plant (and therefore 
multinational) firms. In addition, if goods become ‘lighter’
1 and barriers to cross border location 
fall then again, we might expect to see more multi-plant and multi-national firms 
There is now a large empirical literature on the relation between FDI and trade (see e.g. 
UNCTAD, 1996, OECD, 2002). However, theoretical models do not automatically lead to a 
clear answer as to whether FDI and trade are complements or substitutes. In the Hecksher-Ohlin 
comparative advantage model in Mundell (1957), international trade and international factor 
                                                      
1 By this we mean transport costs per unit of real value fall. This is particularly important in service industries where 




Working Paper Series No. 503
July 2005 
mobility are substitutes, and capital is an homogenous factor input in this model. As Markusen 
(1983) has shown, this substitution relationship is based on the assumption that factor 
endowments alone are the basis for trade and countries are assumed to be otherwise identical. If 
the basis for trade reflects other difference between countries, such as technology, it can be 
shown that a complementary relationship may exist between FDI and trade. The variety of 
possible links between trade and FDI cannot be ignored, and hence we may not expect to find 
that they are the same in all countries. 
It is widely acknowledged that the quality and variety of products and FDI affect trade within the 
monopolistic competition models employed by the new trade theory. This approach builds on 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), which posits the existence of economies with a large number of 
monopolistically competitive firms. Each firm produces a different product under increasing 
returns to scale, and faces a downward sloping demand curve. It is useful to assume that the 
economies of scale are at the level of the firm rather than at the level of the plant, and we assume 
that each firm operates a number of plants all at the minimum cost on a U shaped cost curve
2. If 
the firm grows, the number of plants expands through a cloning process. The number of firms 
indexes the variety of products produced, and the variety of products will depend on factors such 
as the level of R&D and these have to be included in the trade relations we study. 
We can show that trade can be indexed on the number of firms in a simple framework where we 
distinguish between consumption in the domestic and in the foreign market, and between 
production for the domestic market and for the foreign market
3. Let us first set up a world in 
which there is trade but no foreign direct investment. Suppose that preferences of a 
representative consumer in each of two countries, domestic (d) and foreign (f), are such that 
utility of differentiated goods enter symmetrically in a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) 
form : 
                                                      
2 See Barrell and Pain (1997) for a discussion of the importance of knowledge-based assets in multiplant firms 
engaged in foreign trade and investment. 
3  This approach follows that of Magnier and Toujas-Bernate (1994) 
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k f q U  (2) 
Firm i produces good i and the total number of domestically differentiated goods is n. There are 
m differentiated products produced abroad, and domestic consumers buy all goods n+m and their 
utility is Ud, with a similar definition for foreign consumers. It is convenient to assume that 
consumers at home and abroad have the same taste parameter θ. The number of products is large, 
but it is finite because of fixed costs in production. As n  and m  are large we can say that 
production of one good has little effect on other goods. The free-entry condition will drive 
profits to zero. New firms will not contest markets for existing goods, because they can always 
start the production of a new good. After maximising consumer’s utility, the demand for product 
i (or k) can then be approximated by (see Tirole, 1988) 
 0 ,
) 1 /( 1 > =
− − κ κ
ϑ
i i p q  (3) 
We can distinguish between two sets of producers, domestic and foreign, serving each of the two 
markets, domestic and foreign, and we can aggregate these sets in various ways. Each firm has 
(the same number of) multiple plants, some dedicated to domestic production, other for export 
production. We first consider those who supply the domestic market. There are nd domestic 
located plants each charging price pd and supplying qd to the domestic market, and there are md 
foreign located plants each charging price pf and supplying qf. to the domestic market. Suppose 
that there is a specific κ facing each aggregated producer supplying the domestic market. The 
pattern of demand across domestic producers and foreign producers in the domestic market can 
be described by the following share equation 
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representing the market share of domestic firms relative to the share of imported goods. This 
clearly depends on the relative variety of products in the two producing countries which in turn 
depends on relative R&D and other factors that affect technology. If, for instance, technology 
improvements in foreign countries rise faster than at home, then this may be reflected by a 
decrease in the ratio nd / md , as more foreign firms each with the standard number of plants are 
created in order to produce the new varieties generated by R&D. This implies that firms located 
abroad capture a larger share of the home market. 
In this two-country model, we can look at the exporting firms in the same way. Let us assume 
that there are nf  domestic identical plants each charging price pxd and supplying qxd to the 
foreign market and mf foreign identical plants each charging price pxf and supplying qxf to the 
same market. Suppose again that there is a specific κ for each aggregated producer. Then, 
demand can be described by the following export share equation representing the export market 














































Domestic production in the first country is nd + nf made up of producers for the home market and 
exporters, whilst the second country has domestic production of md + mf made up of exporters to 
the first country and domestic producers for this market. Both domestic producers and producers 
for export can be owned by the other country, and can be denoted with the obvious subscripts, as 
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above. In this framework, exports and outward FDI are always substitutes, and faster technology 
development at home raises the export share. 
However, production for export is not the only way the owner of knowledge based assets can 
obtain market share abroad. Some of the cloned plants can be located in the market they serve. 
For instance, an increase of inward FDI may be translated into an increase in nd by nd,f plants 
producing domestically but owned by foreign residents leading to a smaller share captured by 
foreign located plants.
4 Conversely we can argue that it is possible that outward FDI could 
reduce the quality and variety of products produced at home and hence potentially raise imports 
from the mf,f that choose to locate abroad. In this simple framework FDI and trade are always 
substitutes (or unrelated), and they are never complements
5.  
The simple framework above does not allow for heterogeneity between domestic or foreign 
located firms, or between domestic and foreign-owned firms in the domestic market, and does 
not differentiate between product and input markets. Let us now introduce intermediate goods, 
which can vary from managerial input associated with the product specific technology to 
physical inputs into the production process. We can assume that all plants in the domestic market 
need intermediate inputs and that foreign-owned plants (and only foreign owned plants) in the 
domestic market (nd,f ) need to get their intermediate inputs from abroad for production of their 
goods.
6 The intermediate good may reflect country specific goods characteristics that may be the 
result of government regulation. Neither profits nor net output are affected by the use of the 
intermediate. 
                                                      
4 One needs to be careful as inward FDI is a financial flow and only part of this is fixed investment and/or greenfield 
investment, whereas the rest represents a change in ownership. Such a change in ownership upgrades new products, 
and leaves the number of products unchanged. However, changes to the model to incorporate product quality are 
trivial.  
5 However, it could leave imports unchanged if the outward FDI were taking new products and processes with it to 
serve completely new markets. 
6 Initially this could be capital goods to set-up a plant abroad, but later this could simply represent an ‘import-bias’ 
favouring inputs from abroad. 
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Suppose that each consumer good produced by (foreign-owned or domestic-owned) plants in the 
domestic market require the equivalent of δ units of consumer goods. Domestically purchased 
and used intermediates do not enter the utility of the individual as they are part of the final 
product, which is measured on a net, or value added basis. However, imported (and exported) 
intermediate products are recorded differently although they also only enter gross output. It is 
possible that intermediate inputs can exceed the value of net output, although they cannot exceed 
gross output. Imports are now made up of final goods, md and intermediate goods, δ nd,f. We can 
write total imports as md + δ n d,f,. Hence inward FDI, which increases nd.f by one plant but 
reduces direct imports by one unit can raise or reduce imports depending on whether δ is larger 
or smaller than one
7. 
We can further suppose that firms may decide to locate a cloned plant abroad to export to the 
home market in order to take advantage of lower costs or specific regulation advantages
8. Thus, 
plants ni,j,k are located in market i, are owned by country j, and produce for market k such that i, 
j, k are home (d) or abroad (f), and hence there are 8 different type of plants. Plants in d owned 
by country f import intermediates from country f and firms nf,d,d are plants owned by home and 
produce for home, but since they are located in country f they add to imports, but also raise 
exports as they require intermediate inputs to serve the domestic market. It is easy to show that 
the market share of domestic plants over total imports becomes (in volume terms) 
) ( , , , , , , , ,
, , , ,
f f d d f d d d f d f f
d f d d d d








Inward investment can raise imports, reduce them or leave them unchanged depending on the 
type of investment. For instance, a new foreign plant created by merger or acquisition will raise 
imports in country d as it raises imports of intermediate goods as long as δ>0, whereas a 
relocation of a plant from the foreign country where it previously exported to home will reduce 
                                                      
7 We would posit that the larger the country the smaller the proportion of intermediate products needed for a unit of 
exports, but we do not include that feature here. 
8 This requires a slight change in notation to allow for 3 subscripts. 
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imports as long as 1>δ. Other possibilities, including the different effects of outward investment, 
are clearly possible. 
Our understanding of the relationship between trade and FDI cannot depend on theory alone, and 
we need to undertake statistical analysis of the relationship. This can be done on firm level data, 
but this approach has to allow for both birth and death of firms, and it is best combined with case  
studies, as in Griffith (1999). We think that the analysis of aggregate data can reveal important  
patterns and aid in our understanding of the economy. 
 
3.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
3.1. Import and FDI trends over the last 20 years 
Before presenting our empirical results, we briefly discuss the trends in imports and FDI in our  
chosen sample of countries. Our empirical research is based on a database of 22 countries (see  
Table 1
9), representing about 80% of world trade, over 1982 to 2002 (on a quarterly basis). The 
data used are from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). We construct FDI stock 
variables by taking annual stock data in 1980 from UNCTAD and derive the quarterly data by 
interpolation using flow data in IFS (see UNCTAD, 2003 for a description of the method), and 
we then divide these by annualised GDP. The figures we derive for these FDI stocks in terms of  
GDP are consistent with the published annual UNCTAD shares, and the results obtained are not  
significantly different from those in the UNCTAD World Investment Report. 
                                                      
9 In the empirical part, Malaysia has been replaced by Brazil owing to data availability problems. 
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Table 2 – Stocks of FDI as a percentage of GDP 
av. 70s av. 80s av. 90s av. 2000-02 av. 70s av. 80s av. 90s av. 2000-02
US 1.7 4.7 7.7 15.5 2.7 5.2 9.6 15.8
Germany 3.7 4.6 5.4 18.2 4.1 8.3 15.0 28.0
UK 7.9 13.3 24.5 42.4 9.1 19.2 34.9 72.9
Japan 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.3 0.4 0.9 2.4 3.3
France 3.3 5.5 13.3 23.2 3.2 5.9 18.6 41.2
China n.a. 2.3 14.1 30.5 n.a. 0.2 1.6 2.3
Italy 3.0 3.3 5.0 7.1 2.3 3.3 6.3 9.9
Canada 18.4 19.4 20.6 24.3 17.2 18.7 20.6 24.5
Netherlands 8.6 15.7 31.1 60.7 14.1 33.4 57.7 91.4
Hong Kong n.a. 497.3 190.9 257.1 n.a. 1.5 30.9 247.1
Belgium 10.6 17.5 43.8 83.9 8.7 11.8 33.1 67.8
Mexico 8.7 10.5 15.3 22.8 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.6
Spain 0.6 5.2 15.0 22.6 0.3 2.9 5.0 22.0
Korea 1.6 2.2 3.9 9.1 0.3 1.3 4.7 8.4
Singapore 61.3 71.7 79.3 136.1 29.3 30.5 34.6 95.0
Taiwan n.a. 5.3 5.4 9.1 n.a. 0.7 6.1 12.7
Switzerland 8.7 10.8 20.9 40.0 8.7 13.0 39.9 84.5
Austria 3.7 4.9 8.2 16.8 2.1 3.2 7.3 13.3
Australia 14.4 15.5 25.0 31.3 3.2 4.0 12.6 28.1
Sweden 2.6 4.1 17.4 60.3 3.4 10.2 31.2 62.4
Thailand 4.1 4.8 13.0 26.6 0.1 0.1 1.3 2.1
Brazil 9.6 9.4 10.9 26.2 8.6 8.6 8.7 9.4
Outward FDI Inward FDI
 
(Billion dollars and percentage)
Rank Importers Value Share
1 United States 1202.4 18.0
2 Germany 493.7 7.4
3 United Kingdom 345.3 5.2
4 Japan 337.2 5.0
5 France 329.3 4.9
6 China 295.2 4.4
7 Italy 243.0 3.6
8 Canada 227.5 3.4
9 Netherlands 219.8 3.3
10 Hong Kong, China 207.2 3.1
11 Belgium 197.4 2.9
12 Mexico 173.1 2.6
13 Spain 154.7 2.3
14 Korea, Republic of 152.1 2.3
15 Singapore 116.4 1.7
16 Taipei, Chinese 112.6 1.7
17 Switzerland 83.7 1.3
18 Malaysia 79.9 1.2
19 Austria 78.0 1.2
20 Australia 72.7 1.1
21 Sweden 66.2 1.0
22 Thailand 64.7 1.0




Working Paper Series No. 503
July 2005 
Table 2 shows the trends in the shares of FDI stocks in GDP for different periods. This table 
features a few interesting observations. FDI stocks as a percentage of GDP have increased in all 
the countries of our sample, and only inward FDI as a percent of GDP fell, and then only in two  
countries, Hong Kong and Brazil, and across only one early time divisions. Net inward FDI as a 
percent of GDP is ultimately bounded by the value of the assets that generate GDP. However, it 
is clear that none of the countries we observe have reached this ratio, which we might put at 300 
per cent of GDP, or the total value of the domestic capital stock
10. As a result it is clear that 
neither inward nor outward FDI stocks as a percent of GDP are stationary over the period we are 
investigating, and as they started at such low levels, we would not have expected them to display 
this property. In general, we would expect to see the import share in GDP to rise, whilst inward  
and outward FDI increase, but as our theoretical discussion makes clear there are circumstances 
where we might observe declines in import penetration. The stock of FDI relative to GDP cannot  
grow without bound, and hence, once it has reached its upper bound it cannot increase the ratio 
of import to total final expenditures any further. Hence import penetration is bounded, whilst if 
we used the level of real FDI our equations would not display this characteristic. 
The increase in the FDI to GDP ratio was particularly large in the 1990s and in the beginning of 
the 21
st century as liberalisation of goods and financial markets in both Europe and North 
America increased. It is interesting to note from the table that in small open economies, FDI  
stocks (inward and outward) represent a large proportion of GDP (e.g. Netherlands, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Switzerland, Sweden). The table also suggests that among the large industrial 
countries, investment abroad tends to be higher than inward investment. However, the latter has 
increased substantially in the 1990s and over the period 2000-2002. In contrast, the level of  
inward FDI in Japan has remained relatively low, despite a noticeable increase in outward FDI 
                                                      
10 Even if this net ratio forms an upper bound, gross stocks can exceed this percentage of GDP. Outflows of FDI 
create financial assets that can be owned by foreign investors in the country in question. Hong Kong is the only clear 
example of this in our sample. 
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from the 90s. In addition, among the developing countries, Mexico, Thailand, Brazil and China 
attract much more FDI than they make abroad. Hence, in general, the main industrialised 
countries tend to have a net stock of outward FDI, while the developing countries have a net 
stock of inward FDI. 
3.2. The empirical approach 
We first estimate simple specifications including demand and relative price terms, in order to 
estimate “standard” income and price elasticities at the world level. We then include inward and 
outward FDI in order to capture globalisation effects and global integration in production 
processes. Based on panel data techniques, the approach allows us to test the presence of 
differences in parameters across countries. 
Modern panel data techniques allow us to investigate common trends and relationships between 
countries without necessarily assuming that all countries display the same characteristics
11. We 
may treat each country we study as a member of the cross section we analyse. We presume that 
within each country there is a long-run equilibrium relationship
12. It is common to estimate 
models of individual countries with some dynamics of adjustment. These adjustment processes 
may differ for reasons associated with institutions that change the costs of adjustment, and more 
flexible economies may adjust more rapidly. Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that the assumption 
that all members of a group can be included in a common panel with common dynamics can be 
very misleading. If the dynamics of adjustment differ between countries and we assume that they 
are common in estimation, then the resulting dynamics may be biased, and it is possible that the 
estimated speed of response in a pooled model is slower than that observed in any of the 
members of the panel. In order to avoid these problems, we need to estimate individual country 
                                                      
11 Hsiao (2003) discusses modern panel data analysis in dynamic models. The fundamental propositions on which 
we build come from Pesaran and Smith (1995)  
12 Each country needs to display a cointegrating relationship and the members of the panel need to share common 
characteristics in order that we can demonstrate that we have panel cointegration. It is very useful that there are two 
dimensions of equilibrium adjustment to analyse in a panel. Countries that are away from their own equilibrium can 
be presumed to adjust, and those that are not at a shared equilibrium will also be adjusting to that. Pesaran, Shin and 
Smith (1999) discuss panel cointegration in detail.  
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equations and test if a common dynamic specification can be imposed. Our objective is to 
uncover the largest defendable set of commonalities.  
3.3. Benchmark values for income and price elasticities for import equations 
We need to derive some benchmark values for income and price elasticities of the import 
equations for the countries of the sample. We adopt a common model for each country and 
estimate the equations with no common parameters. Our data sets differ in length between 
countries, and in order to utilise the maximum information on all of them we set them up as a 
synthetic unbalanced panel. Hence all countries enter the SURE regressions with the same data 
periods, but the parameter estimates and ‘t’ statistics depend only on the maximum data set 
available in each country. This setup allows us to impose cross equation parameter restrictions 
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where Mi is real imports of country i, TFEi is total final expenditures, RPi is relative price 
(import deflator divided by GDP deflator), αi is the equation intercept, ecti is the coefficient of 
the error correction term, a1i and a2i are the long-term elasticities of import relative to demand 
and prices respectively, βij are the coefficients relative to short-term dynamics terms (for country 
i at time t-j) and eit is the error term. We include log(RP) inside the ECM for ease of exposition, 
although it may be a stationary variable, whilst log(M) and log(TFE) are not. 
The equation has been estimated in one step as an error correction model with a SURE 
approach
13. We report our results in the appendix. The average (not size weighted) income 
elasticity is 1.52, whilst the average (not size weighted) price elasticity is -0.49 (see Table 3 in 
the column marked MGE
14). Size weighting by GDP leaves the demand elasticity unchanged but 
changes the price elasticity to -0.61. The dynamics of adjustment can be summarised by the 
                                                      
13 It is necessary to take account of the dimension of the error matrix in SURE, and we have done that following 
Guichard and Lafargue (2001). For a discussion of the issues see Pesaran (2003). 
14 See Pesaran Smith and Im (1996)  
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average (not size weighted) error correction term of -0.32. It is possible to attach t statistics to 
these averages, and we do so in Table 3, column MGE. We can see from the appendix, the 
individually estimated demand elasticities are high for the UK, Italy and France, but not Japan,. 
Appendix Table 1 shows some other apparent differences across countries as regards the value of 
this elasticity. For instance Mexico and Spain, have elasticities higher than 2, while income 
elasticities for Asian countries (Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand) are closer to 1. The main 
advanced economies are close to the average. The correlation of the demand elasticity with the 
scale of the country, as measured by the rank order of their share in imports, is negative at -0.21 
and with size measured by GDP at PPPs the correlation is 0.01. The price elasticities also vary 
with size, and the correlation with the rank order of trade shares is 0.31 and with country size it 
is -0.21. The correlation of coefficients with their rank order of trade shares is interesting, and 
may reflect a missing variable that is correlated with the level of imports. This systematic 
relationship of the coefficients with another variable would suggest that pooling these countries 
would be problematic. In particular, omitting a potentially significant variable - that is not 
independent of those included - may both bias the coefficient upward and make some 
coefficients spuriously precise, implying difficulties to impose a justifiable commonality. 
There is a sequence of hypotheses that we need to test to look for commonalities. Column 1 of 
Table 3 records the mean group estimates discussed above along with the synthetic ‘t’ statistics 
implied by the estimates. These parameters can be treated as a reasonable and unbiased estimate 
of a common underlying structure, but it is useful to test for commonalities. The common way to 
proceed with panel estimation is to estimate a fixed effect model where we impose all 
coefficients, including those on dynamic elements as well as the long run effects, to be the same. 
We report these estimates in column 5 of Table 3. The income and price elasticities are lower 
than in the SURE system, but the fact that the error correction falls to a very low number 
indicates some misspecification. Pesaran and Smith (1995) suggest that inconsistent pooling may 
bias dynamic responses, and that is clearly what we see here, where the fixed effects error 
correction is at one end of the range of the individual country coefficients, and suggests a much 
lower overall speed of adjustment. Clearly, a fixed effects explanation of import demand would  
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not give us a good basis for understanding trends. In column 2 of Table 3, we report the 
parameters for a pooled mean group estimator where dynamic elements are allowed to differ but 
where the error correction, income and relative price terms are assumed to be the same. The 
results show a sharp decrease in the absolute value of the error correction parameter compared 
with the MGE case (from –0.32 to –0.04). The income elasticity decreases to 1.47 and the 
relative-price coefficient also declines from –0.49 to –0.24. As we can see from Table 4, if we 
test the restriction involved in either the fixed effects estimator or the pooled mean group in 
column 2 then it is clear that they imply overly strong restrictions on the freely estimated 
parameters, and we should reject them. However, we can look at less restricted hypotheses 
concerning commonalities between countries. 











ect  -0.32 (6.64)  -0.04 [-5.50]  Country specific  Country specific  -0.04 [-5.44] 
Y  1.52 (15.80)  1.47 [20.63]  1.17 [63.60]  1.53 [43.04]  1.36 [20.99] 
RP  -0.49 (7.55)  -0.24 [-2.59]  -0.51 [-13.02]  Country specific  -0.20 [-2.17] 
Notes: MGE: Mean Group Estimates 
  PMGE1: Pool Mean Group Estimate with constraints on ect, income and relative price elasticities 
  PMGE2: Pool Mean Group Estimate with constraints on income and relative price elasticities 
  PMGE3: Pool Mean Group Estimate with constraints on income elasticities 
 
Pesaran et al (1999) suggests that the biases associated with incorrect pooling of adjustment 
dynamics can be avoided by testing only for common long-run parameters, and we do this in the 
remaining columns of Table 3. The third column shows the results for PMGE2 (constraints on 
the income elasticity and on the relative price elasticity), and the fourth column shows them for 
PMGE3 (constraints on the income elasticity only). The values of these parameters are different 
across the different models, and removing the dynamic constraint from PMGE1 in PMGE2 gives 
us a higher competitiveness elasticity and a lower demand elasticity. Once again when testing 
these different models against the first one (MGE with all parameters assumed to be country-
specific), all constrained specifications appear to be rejected by a standard likelihood ratio test.  
Table 4 – Tests of different models 
H0 H1  Statistics  Result 
PMGE1  MGE  163.00 (Chi2(63))  H0 rejected 
PMGE2  MGE  100.50 (Chi2(42))  H0 rejected 
PMGE3  MGE  50.77 (Chi2(21))  H0 rejected 
Fixed effects  MGE  376.9 (Chi2(84))  H0 rejected 
 
3.4. Results including FDI in the import equations 
Looking for common parameters in standard models neither gives us systematic evidence of 
lower demand elasticities, nor are any acceptable commonalities. Our theoretical discussion 
suggested that, in an imperfectly competitive world, we would see increased FDI as barriers to 
trade were reduced and as more goods became available, and hence we might expect that this 
variable would play a role in determining the pattern of imports, and that increased globalisation, 
as indexed by FDI penetration, would account for some or all of the excess of income demand 
elasticities. In particular, countries with less FDI may have lower import penetration, and hence 
countries whose (inward and outward) FDI has grown most rapidly may have their measured 
demand elasticity made both larger and more precise if we omit this variable (as the omitted 
variable would be correlated with an included variable). Our theoretical discussion makes it clear 
that patterns of development in import penetration are unlikely to be uncorrelated with 
developments in FDI, and hence the omission of these variables would lead to biased and over 
precise coefficients in our regressions, although in general we cannot be certain whether the bias 
will always be in the same direction. 
In the second part of the empirical evidence, we introduce FDI variables into the specification in 
order to assess the potential impact on income elasticities and on the accuracy with which they 
are measured. More precisely, these variables represent the stock of inward and outward FDI in 
real terms as a percentage of real GDP, where the GDP deflator is used to transform the nominal 
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FDI series into real ones. The following specification is used for the estimations of import 
demand equations with FDI effects: 
t i
j
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out) are the ratio of the stock of inward (outward) FDI on GDP. Given the 
growth in these ratios observed in the last 30 years, neither can be seen as stationary variables, 
and hence they should be included within the equilibrium correction part of our specification. 
Table 5 shows the MGE values of the estimation of our relationships one at a time, and the full 
error correction mechanism, price and demand elasticity results are reported in Appendix Table 2 
for comparison with Appendix Table 1. While the income elasticity is broadly equal to the MGE 
values without FDI, the error correction coefficient is slightly lower and the value of the relative 
price elasticity increases from –0.49 to –0.37. Both inward and outward FDI appear to raise 
imports on average, although the dispersion of estimates across countries is such that in the MGE 
the average coefficients are not significant. Inward and outward FDI seem to have different 
effects in different countries. However, adding FDI on its own does not remove the puzzle on 
high income elasticities when they are freely estimated, although it may allow us to explain why 
they are different if we exclude this variable. 
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Ect  -0.42 (-8.03)  -0.12 [-10.65]  Country specific  Country specific  -0.04 [-5.23] 
Y  1.53 (11.33)  1.33 [23.38]  1.27 [59.47]  1.24[51.17]  1.36 [15.90] 
Rp  -0.37 (3.69)  -0.16 [-3.69]  -0.20 [-5.82]  Country specific  -0.19 [-1.84] 
Inward FDI  0.08 (0.96)  Country specific  Country specific  Country specific  -0.02 [0.18] 
Outward FDI  -0.77(0.35)  Country specific  Country specific  Country specific  0.04 [0.40] 
Notes: MGE: Mean Group Estimates 
  PMGE1: Pool Mean Group Estimate with constraints on ect, income and relative price elasticities 
  PMGE2: Pool Mean Group Estimate with constraints on income and relative price elasticities 
  PMGE3: Pool Mean Group Estimate with constraints on income elasticities 
 
The standard fixed effects estimator is reported in column 5 of Table 5, and as we can see from 
Table 6 the imposition of common parameters on all long-run and dynamic terms is clearly 
invalid. The error correction is once again very low. In this context, the coefficients on FDI are 
small and insignificant, suggesting that the underlying effects are heterogeneous. Differences in 
speeds of response to shocks and in particular differences in the speed of adjustment to a new 
equilibrium clearly differ systematically between countries. The differences between countries in 
terms of the effects of FDI on imports that we see in these unpooled regressions are large enough 
for us not to use these in the PMG. In column 2, we report a regression where FDI effects and 
dynamic terms are allowed to vary between countries but where income and price terms, along 
with the error correction are assumed to be common. The specification gives a relatively low 
income elasticity, and it also reduces the price elasticity. It also displays dynamics of response 
well below the average of the group, and hence the panel set can be presumed to have different 
dynamics amongst its members, and imposing common dynamics is likely to result in biased 
parameters (see Pesaran and Smith (1995)). However, this model is also rejected as a constraint 
on the individual country estimates, as we can see by looking at PMGE1 in Table 6. 
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Table 6 – Tests of different models with FDI 
H0 H1  Statistics  Result 
PMGE1  MGE  235.86 (Chi2(63))  H0 rejected 
PMGE2  MGE  83.66 (Chi2(42))  H0 rejected 
PMGE3  MGE  22.37 (Chi2(21))  H1 rejected 
Fixed effects  MGE  561.84 (Chi2(84))  H0 rejected 
 
When we remove the common error correction in column 3 of Table 5, the income elasticity 
remains relatively low and the price elasticity rises somewhat, although it remains below the 
MGE value, and both are significant. As we can see from Table 6 imposing 2 common 
coefficients is not statistically acceptable. The income elasticity in PMGE2 remains significantly  
and noticeably different from 1. We evaluate a model, PMGE3, where only the demand elasticity 
is constrained to be the same, and we report the coefficient in column 4 of Table 5. It is possible 
to accept that it is a valid imposition, as we can see from Table 6. The average competitiveness  
elasticity in this panel is -0.27. Although FDI is not significant for all the countries in the sample,  
it seems to affect significantly the value of the other estimators by reducing the spurious 
accuracy of their coefficients that came from excluding a variable that was correlated with the 
regressor.  
Based on this sample, we can derive some tentative conclusions as regards the impact of FDI on 
import demand and Table 3 in the appendix reports on the significant FDI coefficients. Inward 
FDI generally has a positive effect on imports and all the significant coefficients are positive for 
this variable. Inward FDI is very low in Japan, and any increases in it have been associated with  
major liberalisation of import restrictions, and hence in this country it has a relatively large  
effect. We would presume that this coefficient would decline as inward FDI rose to international 
levels. The average coefficient on inward FDI in this regression is 2.1, suggesting that inward 
FDI does raise imports. Outward FDI has also positive effects on imports overall, with an  
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average coefficient of 0.27. This coefficient is positive and significant in some developed 
countries (e.g. US, Germany, Italy, Austria, Sweden), while it is negative for some developing 
countries (e.g. Korea, Singapore or Thailand) as well as Belgium. Thailand has very little 
outward FDI, and the large coefficient suggest that this variable has moved with general changes 
in patterns of trade. Singapore and Belgium have large amounts of outward FDI, and they are 
also both small countries with significant levels of trade with close neighbours. These are just the 
situations where we would expect outward FDI to reduce the level of imports as it probably 
reduces production at home for the foreign market. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
It is common to observe that demand elasticities in trade equations for imports are implausibly 
large, and that they differ between countries. Both of these present us with problems, as they 
imply trade will rise without bound as a proportion of GDP, and that a steady state for the world 
economy would be difficult to attain, as imports would grow at different rates in different 
countries. In this paper we have investigated import demand in a large range of countries. Our 
first estimates include only domestic demand, relative prices and the dynamics of adjustment to 
the long-run equilibrium. We tested to see if we could impose the same demand, price and 
adjustment speed parameters, and we found it was statistically impossible to do so. Even when 
we allowed the dynamics to differ between countries we were not able to impose common 
demand and price elasticities, and the observed demand elasticity remained high, even when we 
allowed price elasticities to differ between countries..  
We proceeded to estimate an equation that included the ratios of outward and inward FDI to 
GDP as additional openness and globalisation indicators. These variables appear to have 
removed the spurious accuracy with which we were measuring demand elasticities. The variety 
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of coefficients and effects, which differ between countries, means that we cannot statistically 
justifiably impose a common set of coefficients on inward and outward FDI in all countries, and 
when we do so the coefficients on FDI are not significant. Given that even the sign of FDI 
effects is not clear from our theoretical discussion, this does not surprise us. However, overall  
inward and outward FDI appear to raise imports. It is also not possible to impose common 
dynamics on our equations, but it is possible to impose common income effects once we allow 
for inward and outward FDI as a determinant of import propensities, and the income elasticity of 
demand is reduced to 1.24, well below the estimated elasticities we observe either in single 
country regressions reported in Barrell and te Velde (2002) or those derived in panels when we 
do not include inward and outward FDI. Hence we demonstrate that the inclusion of the ratio of 
outward and inward FDI as a percent of GDP resolves most of these puzzles we face with import  
demand. 
There is clear evidence that models of import demand that do not take account of both the 
importance of globalisation factors as indexed by inward and outward FDI to GDP and of the 
heterogeneity of the impacts of relative prices and FDI produce upwardly biased estimates of the 
income elasticity of demand. However, we would argue that there is need for further research to 
understand both the diversity of FDI effects between countries and the role of other forces 
driving globalisation such as the formation of regional trading systems, which raise imports as a 
proportion of GDP. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 – SURE estimates (without FDI) 
  ∆Y  ect Y RP 
United States  2.40[6.94]  -0.37 [-6.22]  1.65 [27.92]  -0.70[-5.52] 
Germany  2.13 [8.39]  -0.37 [-6.22]  1.60 [11.41]  -0.31 [-2.30] 
United Kingdom  0.91 [6.18]  -0.30 [-3.56]  1.85 [10.72]  -0.32 [-2.44] 
Japan  0.14 [1.64]  -0.13 [-3.93]  0.63 [2.17]  -0.78 [-3.90] 
France  2.25 [10.29]  -0.74 [-7.16]  1.79 [22.00]  -0.36 [-5.76] 
China  0.32 [2.20]  -0.03 [-0.82]  1.66 [3.12]  -0.66 [-1.00] 
Italy  3.97 [16.21]  -0.52 [-7.09]  1.81 [15.04]  -0.29 [-4.18] 
Canada  1.55 [3.68]  -0.11 [-1.45]  1.54 [4.93]  -1.00 [-1.57] 
Netherlands  1.90 [12.87]  -0.34 [-3.54]  1.63 [17.30]  -0.33 [-3.90] 
Hong Kong  1.43 [7.97]  -0.48 [-1.49]  1.21 [31.68]  -0.85 [-6.65] 
Belgium  0.52 [5.22]  -0.29 [-2.55]  1.43 [29.80]  -0.52 [-11.56] 
Mexico  1.36 [4.40]  0.13 [1.57]  2.28 [10.45]  -1.24 [-3.00] 
Spain  2.36 [14.53]  -0.30 [-4.32]  2.49 [15.66]  -0.29[-2.77] 
South Korea  0.56 [7.87]  -0.49 [-4.87]  1.12 [17.31]  -0.64 [-5.85] 
Singapore  0.94 [18.12]  -0.08 [-0.76]  1.32 [3.68]  0.04 [0.04] 
Taiwan  1.32 [12.31]  -0.61 [-7.30]  1.17 [42.30]  -0.47 [-5.99] 
Switzerland  1.62 [4.37]  -0.11 [-1.03]  1.55 [1.85]  -0.60 [-1.99] 
Austria  0.90 [17.74]  -0.57 [-7.24]  1.63 [3.69]  -0.44 [-2.83] 
Australia  1.62 [3.69]  -0.57 [-7.24]  1.71 [28.05]  -0.49 [-4.73] 
Sweden  1.00 [14.80]  -0.39 [-4.14]  1.75 [20.67]  -0.33 [-3.99] 
Thailand  1.99 [7.47]  -0.20 [-2.64]  1.17 [16.35]  -0.25 [-0.87] 
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Table A2 – SURE estimates (with FDI – FDI coefficients omitted) 
  ∆Y  ect Y  RP 
United States  2.39 [6.51]  -0.48 [-6.71]  1.45 [17.97]  -0.63[-5.85] 
Germany  2.22 [10.35]  -0.66 [-8.27]  1.30 [19.99]  -0.10 [-1.90] 
U K  0.98 [6.89]  -0.44 [-4.36]  1.77 [14.35]  -0.29 [-2.90] 
Japan  0.17 [1.94]  -0.23 [-4.40]  0.25 [0.86]  -0.30 [-3.02] 
France  2.16[10.62]  -0.88 [-9.07]  1.56 [19.82]  -0.11[-1.42] 
China  0.47 [2.81]  -0.02 [-0.60]  0.89 [0.48]  1.23 [0.37] 
Italy  3.83 [16.51]  -0.66 [-9.07]  1.58 [14.08]  -0.19 [-2.86] 
Canada  1.66[3.90]  -0.08 [-1.18]  2.70 [1.61]  -0.78 [-1.01] 
Netherlands  1.84 [12.49]  -0.41 [-3.28]  1.68 [7.06]  -0.40 [-4.28] 
Hong Kong  1.42[7.78]  -0.41 [-1.23]  1.21[25.17]  -0.82 [-4.47] 
Belgium  0.48 [4.69]  -0.31 [-2.62]  1.36 [13.91]  -0.51 [-10.76] 
Mexico  1.29[4.17]  0.13 [1.49]  2.44 [3.17]  -1.28 [-2.54] 
Spain  2.31[14.17]  -0.32[-4.45]  2.28 [9.27]  -0.28 [-2.50] 
South Korea  0.49[6.69]  -0.52[-5.18]  0.95 [7.76]  -0.76 [-6.27] 
Singapore 0.88[19.72]  -0.54[-3.73]  1.16[43.64] -0.64  [-14.31] 
Taiwan  1.37[13.56]  -0.79 [-8.74]  1.31[25.21]  -0.35 [-4.79] 
Switzerland  1.74[4.64]  -0.39 [-2.68]  2.73 [6.21]  -0.74[-9.11] 
Austria  0.89 [16.43]  -0.35 [-4.23]  1.41[11.44]  -0.07 [-0.38] 
Australia  1.44 [3.06]  -0.59 [-6.55]  1.75[9.85]  -0.57 [-4.37] 
Sweden  1.04 [14.20]  -0.38 [-3.97]  1.99 [10.37]  -0.41 [-2.94] 
Thailand  1.91[6.08]  -0.27 [-3.42]  1.29 [15.24]  -0.26 [-0.87] 
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Table A3 – Significant Effects of RP and FDI in PMGE3 
  RP  Inward FDI  Outward FDI 
United States  -0.77 [-5.44]  n.s.  0.82 [3.20] 
Germany  -0.12 [-2.46]  n.s.  0.42 [8.22] 
United Kingdom  -0.66 [-3.10]  n.s.  n.s. 
Japan  -0.54 [-2.46]  3.88 [1.89]  n.s. 
France n.s.  0.79  [4.54]  n.s. 
China n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
Italy  -0.26 [-3.94]  n.s.  2.06 [4.67] 
Canada n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
Netherlands  -0.34 [-2.42]  n.s.  0.14 [1.89] 
Hong Kong  -0.75 [-2.94]  n.s.  n.s. 
Belgium  -0.52 [-10.95]  0.20 [2.69]  -0.20[-2.57] 
Mexico n.s.  1.68  [1.73]  n.s. 
Spain  -0.35 [-1.66]  1.00 [3.66]  n.s. 
South Korea  -0.54 [-7.44]  1.02 [1.58]  -1.10 [-1.43] 
Singapore  -0.54 [-7.44]  n.s.  -0.47 [-3.79] 
Taiwan -0.29  [-4.08]  n.s.  n.s. 
Switzerland -0.71  [-3.98]  n.s.  n.s. 
Austria n.s.  n.s.  1.08[2.30] 
Australia  -0.47 [-2.96]  1.58 [1.70]  n.s. 
Sweden n.s.  n.s.  0.22  [1.33] 
Thailand n.s.  n.s.  -13.77  [1.80] 
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